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REPORT 
Number 25-July 1978 
The Homestead Property Tax Relief Act 
And The. State Budgetary Process 
by 
William C. Barlet* 
Introduction 
On January 5, 1977, in accordance with Article 6, Section 
9 of the Constitution of Montana, Governor Thomas L. 
Judge transmitted to the 45th legislative assembly the 1977-
79 biennial executive budget recommendations for state 
government. The governor unveiled what he termed "a 
taxpayer's budget, pared to a bare minimum, yet adequately 
addressing the problems facing Montana during the 
upcoming biennium." 
The proposed executive budget called for record 
expenditures of $1.9 billion of state and federal funds in the 
1977-79 biennium. The governor advised members of the 
legislature that the proposed all-funds biennium budget of 
$1.87 billion would be 15 percent larger than the 1975-77 
budget of $1.63 billion without being inflationary. Governor 
Judge estimated that federal funds would provide about 
$500 million of the 1977-79 budget, or slightly more than 
one-fourth of the governmental expenditures he wanted the 
legislators to approve. Judge said his budget, if accepted, 
would halt the growth of state government and actually 
reduce the number of state employees, while necessitating no 
personal tax increases in the two years of the biennium. The 
general-fund portion of the executive budget-the 
anticipated cash revenue which the legislature must officially 
allocate, in accordance with Section 79-415, Revised Codes 
of Montana, 1947- amounted to $448.6 million. Thus, the 
executive budget proposed a 26 percent increase in the 
general-fund portion. The governor attributed the increase 
to the direct allocation of general-fund monies for the 
property tax relief initiative approved by the Montana 
electorate in the November 2, 1976 general election, and for 
the elimination of the statewide permissive levy for public 
schools. The executive stated that, excluding those two 
direct allocations, the general-fund operating budget for the 
new biennium would be only 12 percent higher than for the 
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1975-77 biennium. The governor concluded that the 
proposed executive budget provided $61.4 million in direct 
property tax relief. 
Thomas Judge had emphasized the need for,property tax 
relief in his successful campaign for a second term as 
Montana's governor, and the Homestead Relief Act became 
almost a running mate for the governor during the 
campaign. On the eve of the 45th session, the governor 
termed the Homestead Relief Act, and the plan to fund it 
with a general fund surplus, an expression of the people's 
desire for property tax relief. The "State Funded Homestead 
Tax Relief Act," Initiative 72, had been backed by a decisive 
popular vote the November before. The initiative carried 
every Montana county; 71 percent of qualified electors 
voting indicated their approval and 204,532 persons favored 
the proposal. Governor Judge contended that no longer 
could the Homestead Relief Act be called his proposal, since 
the measure had received that 71 percent majority. He 
insisted that the message embodied in the results of the 
election must be interpreted as a mandate from the people, 
and he directed the legislature on the eve of the session to 
consider that popular expression. 
I THE LEGISLATURE ACTS 
As the 45th Montana Legislature began deliberations, the 
governor spelled out what he wanted in terms of property tax 
relief legislation in his State of the State address. He pointed 
out that although Montana ranked 40th among the 50 states 
in all taxes collected per capita, the state ranked 6th in 
property taxes levied per capita. Judge said state 
government only receives less than 5 percent of property tax 
revenues, but it is the state's responsibility to insure that 
ability to pay is maintained as the prevailing principle of 
equitable taxation among all political jurisdictions within its 
boundaries. The governor contended that the property tax 
conflicted with that principle. He maintained in his State of 
the State address that if the legislature accepted his proposed 
budget, including $31.8 million to eliminate the statewide 




amount coming from the state's federal revenue-sharing 
funds, there would be no statewide property taxes for 
support of public schools in Montana during the two years 
of the biennium. The governor then called upon the 
legislature to appropriate $3.5 million from state income tax 
surcharge revenues for sharing with local governments 
which might be hurt by property tax limitations. This 
property tax relief plan had constituted Thomas Judge's 
number one campaign pledge, and he offered the Homestead 
Relief Act as the beginning of permanent property tax relief 
in Montana (adding that every biennial legislature would 
have to continue to provide .funding to keep the program 
going). The governor stated that this means of relief would 
begin to redress the imbalance facing residential property 
owners who have been held disproportionately responsible 
for support of Montana school systems and local 
governments. 
Therefore, the 1977 Montana Legislature opened with 
property tax revision as one of the key points on its agenda. 
To proponents of the Homestead Relief Act, the measure's 
impressive victory at the polls meant that the 45th 
Legislature was obligated to appropriate the needed funds. 
However, the governor's contention that the Homestead 
Relief Act's funding should be in the "legislative bag" 
because the people had registered their approval of the 
measure created legislative waves. 
Thomas Judge had previously backed two property tax 
relief measures in the legislature; SB 312 in 1974, and SB 11 
in 1975. The Montana Senate rejected both, with SB 312 
going down by a roll call vote of 36-5 and SB 11 losing 48-0. 
In the fall of 1976, the governor made the decision to conduct 
an initiative campaign (under provisions of Article 3, 
Section 4 of the Montana constitution). Governor Judge 
directed the formation of the initiative committee, the 
Citizens For Property Tax Relief, and on January 2, 1976, 
the campaign began to secure the 15,938 signatures of 
registered voters needed on petitions proposing statutory 
changes in Montana. Although Governor Judge did not 
participate directly in the initiative campaign in an official 
capacity, he informally coordinated the committee's efforts 
to secure citizen support. The campaign produced 16,251 
signatures by the deadline date, three months before the date 
of the election, and Initiative 72 officially became part of the 
November 2nd ballot. 
The ballot submitted to the qualified electors of Montana 
included title and text of the initiative, with the following 
words: 
For reduction of owner's property tax liability on owner-occupied 
residential property. 
Against reduction of owner's property tax liability on owner-occupied 
residential property. 
Voters approved the initiative and the State Funded 
Homestead Tax Relief Act became law. However, the 
initiative did not, by itself, reduce property taxes on each 
owner-occupied home. Initiative 72 did not place an 
affirmative duty on the legislature to fund the proposal. 
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Since Article 3, Section 4 of the Montana constitution 
specifies that the people may not enact laws by initiative for 
appropriations of money, and Article 9, Section 14 specifies 
only the legislature may appropriate moneys, the 
Homestead Relief Act merely provided that "to the extent 
funds are provided by the legislature" property tax relief 
would be forthcoming. In effect, this meant that should the 
legislature have refused to appropriate funds for this 
purpose, neither the governor nor state taxpayers would 
have had any legal recourse to obtain state funds. 
Although they had no legal recourse, supporters of the 
initiative could pursue avenues of political recourse. To 
avoid the legislature's refusal to fund the measure, 
proponents brought numerous pressures to bear upon 
legislators balking at the proposal or entertaining hopes for 
alternative measures. Governor Thomas Judge, an 
aggressive defender of the relief proposal, served as a catalyst 
for those pressures. 
The substantive criticisms began when the legislature's 
chief fiscal analyst stated that the governor's 1977-79 budget 
would not provide any overall net property tax relief. The 
fiscal analyst made his property tax observations in an 
analysis of the executive budget, in accordance with section 
43-1114, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947. The analysis 
represented the first comprehensive review of an·executive 
budget in Montana. In 1975, the legislature established the 
fiscal analyst's position as a means to provide a review of the 
executive budget. Legislators believed an independent 
analysis would allow the legislature to examine a range of 
fiscal policy options that previously had not been available. 
The legislature initiated the review process not as a means to 
criticize the recommendations of the executive, but as a 
means to "present alternative recommendations when 
meaningful alternatives are clearly available." The role of the 
fiscal analyst quite often could be an irritant to the governor. 
The analysis of Governor Judge's proposals by the analyst 
provided the legislature with alternative interpretations 
concerning the state's role in property tax relief. The analysis 
of the governor's tax relief plan began: 
The executive budget purports to contain $61.4 million in direct 
property tax relief over the biennium. We believe there is no net 
property tax relief in the budget. 
The fiscal analyst argued that the governor's proposed state 
aid to public schools would be so low that property taxes 
which support local schools would have to be raised by $30 
million statewide. The fiscal analyst contended that that 
figure would almost exactly offset the $29.6 million the 
governor had included for the reduction of statewide 
property taxes on owner-occupied homes. He recommended 
that the legislature increase public school support by $30 
million above what the governor had recommended, adding 
that only then would the $29.6 million Homestead Relief Act 
that the governor supported and the Montana voters had 
approved be real tax relief. The fiscal analyst said his own 
recommended level of state public school support would 
allow total school spending to increase about 7.25 percent 
annually, while holding taxes on existing real property 
constant. The governor contended that his proposal would 
allow a 6 percent increase in total public school spending. 
The fiscal analyst maintained that the cost increases assumed 
in the executive calculation would entail increasing the 
average voted school property tax levy 10 mills by the end of 
the biennium, and that the governor's budget staff 
overestimated the availability of other revenue which could 
be used for schools. 
The director of the Office of Budget and Program 
Planning, who is in charge of preparing the governor's 
proposed budget, answered the fiscal analyst by contending 
the executive budget did, in fact, contain the $61.4 million in 
direct property tax relief. The director maintained that the 
fiscal analyst had mistakenly calculated that school budgets 
would grow by 7.25 percent annually, since the analyst had 
not taken into account what the director said would be a 
decline in enrollment during the biennium. The director also 
called the fiscal analyst's 7.25 percent figure "inflationary," 
nothing that Congress had projected an inflation rate of only 
4.8 percent and the Consumer Price Index had been 
projected to rise only 5.5 percent in 1977. 
One major problem of the relief plan recognized by 
proponents and criticized by opponents concerned the lack 
of tax relief provided by the measure for renters or others 
who do not own the homes they occupy-a number 
estimated by opponents of the measure as comprising one-
third of Montana's population. To address that specific 
criticism of the plan, supporters promised that renters would 
not be overlooked in the relief. In a pamphlet provided by 
the Secretary of State's office, Voter Information for 
Proposed Constitutional Amendments, Referendums, and 
Initiatives, which included voter information for the 
November 2, 1976 election, the Citizens for Property Tax 
Relief promised that renters would be aided. The rebuttal to 
the argument advocating rejection of the measure stated: 
" .. . legislation to provide relief to renters is being prepared 
for introduction in the 45th legislative assembly and would, 
if enacted, become effective at the same time as Initiative 72." 
However, except for the Property Tax Replacement Act, 
which the governor opposed and is discussed below, no one 
introduced legislation during the 45th legislative assembly to 
provide property tax relief to renters. 
To deal with this unorganized array of opposition, the 
governor resumed his high-profile strategy and countered 
with the strengths inherent in his executive role. The 
governor, as is his constitutional prerogative (Article 6, 
Section 9 of the Montana Constitution), issued a mid-
session budget message to the legislature. In the message, the 
governor brandished his veto power. He stated that he would 
not tolerate any legislative tinkering with his Homeowner's 
Property Tax Relief Act, nor would he allow a deficit 
budget. The governor addressed the legislature: 
Politics is the art of compromise . . . however, this governor will not 
compromise the state of Montana into a general-fund deficit, or 
- - - -- ---- .... & ....... .LU.'-'" UJ.al. LUC:: lt::l!JSIHTllrP.·t! r/'\l,p. nt 
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repudiate the overwhelming mandate of the electorate for property tax 
relief. 
The governor cautioned the legislature that he would veto 
any spending measure that would reduce money available 
for the property tax measure, any attempt to repeal it, and 
any increase of more than 6.3 percent in the state foundation 
program for support of public schools. Governor Judge 
closed his mid-session budget message with the warning: 
I continue to maintain full confidence in Montana's ability to provide 
adequate service levels for citizens, to provide full funding of the 
property tax relief law enacted by the people, and to maintain a $12.5 
million surplus as a cushion against unforeseen fluctuations in the 
economy. I will, as I have indicated in the State of the State message 
and this letter, resist with the full constitutional power of this office, 
legislative actions which counteract attainment of those goals. 
As legislators digested the executive's message, the 
governor scheduled visits around the state to discuss the 
Homestead Relief Act and its progress through the session. 
These visits prompted charges from some sectors that the 
trips constituted political junkets. The governor repeatedly 
said throughout the state: " ... I am amazed and shocked 
that there are legislators who are reluctant to support the 
measure after it was carried by an absolute overwhelming 
margin by the people." 
Therefore, as the session progressed, the governor again 
made it clear to the legislature and Montana citizens that he 
expected the plan to be funded-and funded intact. The 
governor promised to use his constitutional prerogatives 
should his executive proposals be endangered by revision or 
alternative spending. And he continued to make it known to 
the legislature that any attempt to revise or deny funding 
would be interpreted as a blatant disregard of the people's 
wishes. The governor, in effect, admonished legislators that 
failure to fund the Homestead Relief Act would be 
tantamount to snubbing the democratic initiative process, 
and that he, in his role as executive, would be pointing out 
that fact to each and every Montana voter. 
At one point during the session, the governor advised 
legislators that they should increase state income taxes if 
state revenues would not be sufficient to fund his tax plan. 
The governor commented to the press that if the money 
would not be available from any other source, he would 
support an income tax increase because he believed that 
Montanans would prefer an income tax increase if they 
could realize some property tax relief. Governor Judge made 
this comment after being advised by a group of legislators 
that the large number of revenue bills that had been filed 
during the session and the governor's own fiscal projections 
for the public school funding program jeopardized the 
funding of the Homestead Relief Act. Legislators believed 
that the public would tend to view an income tax increase as 
the responsibility of the legislature, while property tax relief 
would be credited to the governor. Thus, the alternatives 
available to legislators appeared to be: (1) sacrifice their own 
bill preferences and fund the Homestead Relief Act; (2) fund 
-- -- - J:' --•.u.1.&'-'&J V.lU, f Ull'I;. 
their pet bills and the Homestead Relief Act, thereby 
necessitating more state revenue, probably in the form of 
increased income taxes; or, (3) refuse to fund the Homestead 
Relief Act. 
As the Homestead Relief Act continued to draw flak for 
substantive reasons, the alternatives available to legislators 
created no shortage of political skirmishes. As the deadline 
for transmittal of the bill from the House to the Senate 
approached, both Republican and Democratic legislators 
leveled charges at the governor. Legislators accused the 
governor of attempting to enter the legislative branch 
through the "back door" with the Homestead Relief Act and 
forcing the lawmakers into a political corner on the issue. 
As the transmittal deadline drew closer, House 
Democrats, who held a 57-43 majority, continued to be 
strongly split over the Homestead Relief Act. On April 6, a 
straight party-line vote in the House forced a delay on the 
relief plan vote. The intent of the delay was to give House 
Democrats time to work out their differences over the 
measure in the privacy of the caucus. Opposition among 
Democrats ranged along the lines of criticisms discussed 
above. Yet the legislators could not ignore the governor's 
pressure nor the fact that the plan had been backed by over 
200,000 Montanans. Republicans, on the other hand, argued 
that the governor's proposal be considered as quickly as 
possible and, some said, killed if possible. Yet it seemed 
doubtful that House Republicans would hold the line 
against funding the measure; a majority of their constituents 
had probably voted for the measure, since the initiative 
carried every county in the state. Some Republican 
legislators weighed the thought of embarrassing the 
Democratic governor by joining Democratic dissidents. 
Despite substantive opposition and frustration emanating 
from the governor's aggressive tactics, the Democratic 
majority in the Montana House of Representatives reversed 
its position on the Homestead Relief Act on April 8. With 
the Democrats muting their opposition, and with 
Republican help, the Homestead Relief Act received funding 
for at least the first year of the 1977-79 biennium. The 
measure cleared the House on a vote of 71-29. Democratic 
floor leaders secured support by exerting pressure and 
proposing an amendment to the funding measure. The 
House amended the funding measure, HB 838, on the floor 
to insure that tax relief for a second year would not drain the 
general-fund below $6 million. The amendment also 
stipulated that the plan not operate for the 1978 tax year if 
the general-fund falls below $15 million. 
The House sent both the Homestead Relief Act and the 
Property Tax Replacement Act (HB 3) to the Senate for 
deliberation, but the replacement plan met with opposition 
in the smaller body . . During the Senate Taxation 
Committee's hearing on HB 3, proponents of the Property 
Tax Replacement Act leveled charges at the executive 
branch for violations of the separation of powers doctrine 
(Article 3, Section 1 of the Montana Constitution). The 
charges stemmed from the belief that the governor had sent 
individuals from the executive branch to represent his 
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opinions at the committee's hearing. Supporters of the tax 
replacement plan also contended that these representatives 
violated another law because they .had not registered as 
lobbyists in accordance with Section 43-803 of the Revised 
Codes of Montana, 1947. The objections concerned the 
testimony of five members of the Montana Department of 
Revenue at the April 7 hearing. Proponents of the Property 
Tax Replacement Act contended that the governor had 
"badgered" them in order to defeat the tax replacement 
measure and secure funding for the Homestead Relief Act. 
The committee chairman's ruling that the committee had 
issued an invitation to department spokesmen erased any 
question of illegality concerning their testimony. Yet the 
author of the Property Tax Replacement Act commented on 
record that he had never seen a bill so lobbied by a governor.. 
Although nothing illegal did in fact occur, the opposition 
to HB 3 by the Department of Revenue consisted of well 
organized presentations and comprehensive coverage. The 
department's incoming director acknowledged that the 
testimony represented unique participation by the 
department: 
It is our normal custom to testify in an informal manner and as 
succinctly as possible, for the purpose of conserving your time. Because 
of the complexities and far reaching implications of this bill, we are 
with the Chair's indulgence, altering our usual format. 
In any event, the Revenue Department's testimony did not 
cause HB 3 to be defeated in the powerful Senate Taxation 
Committee. It passed by a 6-4 vote. The measure had earlier 
passed the House by an overwhelming 67-28 bipartisan vote 
despite the governor's repeated warnings that he would veto 
the measure should it be approved. The Property Tax 
Replacement Act eventually went down to defeat in the 
Senate by a vote of 29-18. 
The Montana Senate approved funding for the 
Homestead Relief Act on April 18 by a vote of 35-15. 
Immediately following the vote, Governor Judge 
commented: 
Great news ... it has been a long battle-four years of work on our 
part. It's a great victory for the more than 200,000 Montanans who 
voted for it. 
Opponents felt voters had been duped into voting for 
illusory tax relief by a governor with further political 
ambitions. Similarly, they felt that the governor acted in a 
fiscally irresponsible manner because of his use of the 
initiative campaign. Some termed the plan a political 
gimmick to assure Thomas Judge's re-election to Montana's 
highest office and contended that the overwhelming success 
of Initiative 72 stemmed from the nature and timing of the 
"selling" campaign waged by proponents. Opponents viewed 
the governor's use of the initiative and public opinion as 
overstepping the boundaries between the executive and 
legislative branches of Montana state government. They said 
the presence of the initiative on the 1976 ballot declared, in 
effect: "We have a $50 million surplus up here in Helena, 
wouldn't you like to have some of itT' Opponents 
maintained that no voter would turn down an enticing deal 
like that; even renters would not turn it down, since they had 
been promised accompanying relief legislation. 
Those who supported the Homestead Relief Act termed 
the victory a success for Montana and the beginning of real 
property tax relief. Supporters perceived every attempt to 
defeat the measure as a legislative slap-in-the-face to the 
citizens who voted yes on Initiative 72. But some legislators 
who voted for the act felt backed into a corner fiscally and 
politically. 
In the end, however, the Homestead Relief Act passed 
both houses of the Montana legislature by greater than a two 
to one margin. Initiative 72, which had not constitutionally 
required the 45th legislature to appropriate funds, had been 
in the legislative bag after all. The electorate of Montana 
now had the tax relief they voted for, and the governor had 
received everything he wanted in the 1977-79 biennium 
budget. 
II AN EVALUATION 
The events leading to the funding of the Homestead Relief 
Act serve as an example of the complexities of the state 
budgetary process. Moreover, areas of controversy and 
concern remain with regard to the effects that those events 
will have on future state budgetary processes. The history of 
the Homestead Relief Act assumes added importance when 
viewed as events which could reoccur. For this reason, it 
appears useful to examine those events. 
It is obvious that proposed legislation lives or dies upon 
the support that sponsors are able to muster. Similarly, it is 
apparent that the odds are weighted towards legislation 
supported by those who are in a position to exert influence 
upon other participants in the process. Along these lines, the 
world of budgeting has been described as a drama, 
populated by a wide and diverse variety of actors socialized 
into roles and utilizing those roles as calculating devices to 
simplify their budgetary decisiqn-making processes. This 
view has been articulated further in that the roles fit in w,ith 
one another and set up a pattern of mutual expectations 
among the participants. This concept of roles and 
expectations in the budgetary process is applicable in the 
case of the Homestead Relief Act, as there were conflicting 
interpretations of what constituted legitimate behavior. The 
fact that citizen input became directly involved through 
Initiative 72 prompted some members of the legislature to 
perceive that an unexpected role had been incorrectly and 
unfortunately interjected into the budgetary process. To 
these members of the 45th legislature, the initiative 
represented pressure from outside the customary budgetary 
process. 
The use of the initiative involved a hybrid form of 
democracy, composed of representative democracy and 
direct democracy. There are obvious contradictions in the 
two. The Homestead Relief Act drew attention to these 
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inherent contradictions and how they affected the state 
budgetary process. In the succeeding pages, the use of the 
hybrid democratic system is analyzed, along with its 
implications for the state budgetary process. The roles of the 
actors in the 1977-79 biennial budgetary process, and the 
actors' interpretations of those roles as affected by the hybrid 
democratic system, are also examined. Constitutionally 
prescribed roles are examined in the context of the political 
pressures that emanated from the passage of Initiative 72. 
Criticisms of the Homestead Relief Act are relevant to this 
analysis in that they provide evidence that the legislature 
made comparisons of alternatives and studied the relative 
value of proposals. Furthermore, the substantive criticisms 
and defenses of the governor's proposals provide evidence 
that the budgetary process kindled controversy over how the 
state's limited resources should be allocated. 
Nevertheless, the November vote could not be 
overfooked. Only those who believe that budgeting is purely 
an economic endeavor can minimize the effects that 
Initiative 72 had on the legislative budgetary process. Those 
who know that budgeting is essentially a political process 
recognize that political pressures stemming from the 
initiative had decided effects upon the political feasibility of 
alternatives available to legislators concerning the funding 
of the Homestead Relief Act. 
What can be argued (and legislators made this argument) 
is that through the inclusion of an external participant, the 
governor sought to circumvent the established fiscal process. 
In other words, the governor "stacked the deck" in his favor 
by creating a scenario in which the executive and legislative 
roles assumed new meaning. Initiative 72 serves as an 
example of a governor's fundamental advantage in using the 
initiative process to secure support for executive proposals. 
That advantage is inherent in the governor's role in the state 
organization. Any governor who chooses to attempt to 
garner support through an initiative campaign possesses all 
of the powers of public accessibility available to a chief 
executive. This ability to maintain high visibility with the 
public affords a governor the opportunity to "sell" an idea to 
the electorate by using those official lines of communication. 
The legislature has no comparable means within the state 
organization to rally public opinion. 
When employed by a governor to gain acceptance of 
executive proposals, the initiative process tilts the balance 
between executive and legislative power towards the 
executive. Through the initiative process a governor can, in 
effect, sidestep the legislature by first selling a proposal to the 
electorate. Legally the role of the legislature is not shifted. 
Nevertheless, a de facto role shift does occur when the 
electorate becomes directly involved in policy formulation. 
The political pressures upon a legislature to comply with the 
electorate's message embodied in an initiative are a 
compelling force. 
It is interesting to speculate whether the Property Tax 
Replacement Act might have passed had it not been for the 
confrontation with the governor and his budget and 
Initiative 72. The same holds true for other items of 
legislation and appropriation during the session. Items 
which posed threats to the funding of the governor's relief 
plan occupied a position of double jeopardy, in that they 
faced gubernatorial opposition and they could be 
interpreted as violating the will of the electorate. The 
governor, in two previous sessions, had failed to sell similar 
property tax legislation to legislators. Considering those two 
previous defeats, the amount of substantive opposition to 
the Homestead Relief Act voiced by legislators throughout 
the session, and the number of dollar-consuming "pet" bills 
introduced by legislators, it is likely that without Initiative 72 
the legislative budgetary process would have produced 
different fates for the Property Tax Replacement Act and 
other items of appropriation and legislation. 
Implications for Public Budgeting 
The precedent set by Governor Judge's successful 
employment of the initiative process has increased the 
likelihood that future state budgetary decisions will be 
similarly affected by direct voter involvement through 
initiatives. In addressing the implications of the use of the 
initiative process in state fiscal policy making, it is useful to 
approach the matter in two ways: (1) the merits of the 
initiative process as a means to affect state fiscal policy; and 
(2) the impact the initiative process is likely to have on future 
state fiscal processes. 
Because the biennial budget is, in effect, the "blueprint" by 
which the state operates for two years, the means through 
which that budget is formed are vitally important. The use of 
the initiative process to affect state fiscal decisions poses 
potentially detrimental consequences. The perplexing issue 
is whether or not the electorate has the expertise or the 
information with which to make complex choices between 
alternative uses of state funds. As the state's fiscal process 
becomes evermore complex, with the Montana 1977-79 
biennial budget at nearly $1 billion, can the state continue to 
honor the initiative process when that process represents 
potential fiscal insolvency? Is there any feasible way to 
provide an electorate with the information needed to judge 
adequately the merits of alternative uses of funds? The 
Homestead Relief Act provides an example of the initiative 
process creating political pressures which directly affected 
the legislature's control of state funds. Upon what criteria 
did the electorate make their decision? Is the value of the 
initiative process sufficient to offset the potential costs? 
The complexities of contemporary state government 
preclude the entire electorate's dealing with relevant fiscal 
information upon which to base budgetary decisions: 
In a democratic society, the division of resources between the public 
and private sectors is roughly determined by the electorate, but because 
it is such a complex and time consuming task, the electorate is 
chronically ignorant of the costs and benefits of many actual and 
potential government policies. 
Collectively, the electorate is usually incapable of adequately 
weighing specific policy alternatives. Decisions requiring 
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detailed examination of relative values of complex and 
technical uses of funds severely strain an electorate's 
capability to render sound choices. Incapacity to weigh 
adequately specific policy alternatives does not preclude the 
electorate's ability to address broad policy issues rationally, 
nor the ability to evaluate rationally the actions of elected 
representatives in pursuit of those broad policies. In other 
words, an electorate can rationally determine ends, but must 
delegate authority to devise the specific, complex and 
technical means to reach those ends. An electorate, in this 
sense, while being unable collectively to critique specific 
means, is capable of assessing outcomes of specific policies. 
Elected representatives weigh the relative values of 
specific policy alternatives designed to achieve the broad 
policy objectives voiced collectively by the electorate. 
Therefore, within the representative system an electorate can 
rationally determine if representatives are serving their 
interests, while not being capable of determining the merits 
of specific means to those ends. Similarly, elected 
representatives can assess the broad desires of an electorate, 
and thus make specific choices among complex alternatives 
designed to achieve those policy objectives. 
In the case of Initiative 72, Governor Judge presented to 
the Montana electorate a skillfully marketed "package". 
Any voice of opposition able to tarnish that package 
required similarly skillful orchestration. The initiative did 
not appear to represent imminent financial danger to the 
state. To the contrary, Initiative 72 as presented to the 
electorate was an attractive proposition. Certainly the 
wording of the proposal on the ballot contributed to the 
success of the Homestead Relief Act, for undoubtedly few 
taxpayers would choose to vote "against reduction of 
owner's property tax liability on owner-occupied residential 
property". Without any systematic method of supplying the 
electorate with the information upon which to judge the 
merits of the Homestead Relief Act relative to alternative 
uses of state funds, the opposition to Initiative 72 remained 
strictly spontaneous and unorganized. 
In contrast, the Budgetary Procedures Ceiling Act of 
1976, an initiative proposal on the same ballot as Initiative 
72, experienced a considerably greater amount of 
opposition. The Budgetary Procedures Ceiling Act sought to 
put a ceiling of $375 million on Montana legislative 
appropriations for any one biennium, along with a gradual 
halt to the state's use of federal funds. If that initiative 
proposal had passed, and the ceiling had been interpreted to 
apply to all of the funds appropriated by the legislature, the 
results could have been chaotic. While it can be argued that 
this initiative's failure demonstrates the electorate's basic 
awareness and responsibility, it can similarly be argued that 
the electorate simply responded to the great amount of 
opposition which emanated from across the political 
spectrum. The difference in amount of opposition voiced 
against Initiative 72 and the Budgetary Procedures Ceiling 
Act obviously can be attributed to the nature of the two 
initiative proposals. Yet, it is similarly valid to attribute the 
lack of organized opposition to Initiative 72 to the fact that 
such opposition seemed to represent opposition to the idea 
of property tax relief. As discussed previously, while many 
legislators shared the Montana electorate's desire for 
property tax relief, many legislators opposed the Homestead 
Relief Act as a means to reach those ends. Yet, many avoided 
taking a firm stand because such a position represented real 
political risks. 
Unlike Initiative 72, broad policy objectives should be 
delineated by the electorate, and the specific values of 
alternative means to reach those objectives should be chosen 
by elected representatives in a representative democracy. In 
this sense, the criteria for what constitutes the "best" specific 
uses of state funds are set by elected representatives. 
Although the process of legislative appropriations has been 
shown to be grossly inadequate at times, and there is no 
guarantee that the best choice will be made by a legislature, 
that body is in a better position than the electorate to address 
fiscal issues and make specific choices. The "correctness" of 
those specific choices, in the final analysis, is determined by 
Montana voters who ultimately assess the responsiveness of 
those representatives in directing government activities. 
Elected representatives can be removed from office through 
the electoral process if state voters should judge them to be 
unresponsive. Although the state bureaucracy possesses the 
expertise to render sound fiscal decisions, the electorate has 
no direct electoral means to hold the bureaucracy 
accountable for its actions. The legislature's accountability 
to the electorate tends to overshadow other deficiencies of 
legislative decision-making, and in this sense, the legislature, 
rather than the bureaucracy, should engage in the budgetary 
process. Without that accountability, the electorate's 
influence over governmental decisions would be severely 
limited. Therefore, the deficiencies in the electorate's ability 
to render sound decisions on specific, complex policy issues, 
and the lack of direct means with which to hold the state 
bureaucracy accountable for its actions, places the 
legislature in the best position to allocate the state's limited 
resources. 
As the initiative process now stands in Montana state 
government, the initiative is inadequate as a means to allow 
direct voter involvement in specific fiscal policy formulation, 
such as the Homestead Relief Act. Although it is still on the 
books, the initiative process is not suitable in cases of specific 
policy formulation, and until the time major revisions are 
designed to remedy the obvious deficiencies, the initiative 
will have no legitimate place in state fiscal decision-making. 
Although the initiative process is unsuitable for specific 
fiscal policy formulation, the precedent set by Governor 
Judge's successful employment of the initiative may dictate 
an increasing use of that process for future state fiscal policy-
making. It remains to be seen if future Montana governors 
will follow suit. 
The Homestead Relief Act represents an instance in which 
the initiative process made an impact on the budgetary 
process- whether "enlightened" or not. This is unusual in 
the United States but is solidly in the populist tradition. The 
problem stems from the fact that the legislature's role of 
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choosing the specific means to achieve policy objectives was 
upset. Through an initiative such as the Homestead Relief 
Act, the electorate indicates specific policy desires, and the 
legislature's contribution is fundamentally altered. 
The implications of Initiative 72 for public budgeting are 
obvious. While the initiative process has long been 
represented as a bulwark of democracy, the complexities of 
contemporary state government operations have raised 
legitimate doubt as to the suitability of the initiative as a 
means to make state fiscal decisions. The issue involves not 
merely a governor's opportunity to increase leverage within 
the state organization, but more fundamentally it is a 
question of direct citizen involvement in specific policy 
choices affecting the fiscal operation of the state. The story 
of the Homestead Relief Act suggests that in the 
complexities of contemporary state government budgetary 
processes, the initiative process is a sacred cow that deserves 
to be laid to rest. 
Political Implications 
A corrollary issue is the political consequences of actions 
taken by participants in the history of the Homestead Relief 
Act. If the measure does not redeem the promises made, 
those associated with its sponsorship will likely incur 
political losses. Similarly, should the measure be received 
favorably, the sponsors will benefit politically. It remains to 
be seen just how well the relief plan will operate and what its 
effect will be on other governmental areas such as the state 
public school system. 
The manner in which the operation of the plan is received 
involves a variety of variables. The governor portrayed the 
plan as "the beginning of real property tax relief in 
Montana", yet whether that confidence is shared by 
Montana property taxpayers upon' receipt of the relatively 
small rebate is questionable. It is entirely possible that 
Montana taxpayers will perceive that the small rebate does 
in fact, as criticized by opponents, offer little as far as 
comprehensive, on-going property tax relief. The fact that 
the "widespread property tax relief' promised by the 
governor could be obtained only if applied for, poses 
potentially undesirable consequences for the governor since 
the number of actual applications proved to be substantially 
less than the number of taxpayers eligible to apply. Should 
the Homestead Relief Act prove injurious to counties' ability 
to fund public schools, it will be interesting where the blame 
is placed- on the Judge administration or the legislature. It 
is a fairly safe assumption that the inclusion in the funding 
bill of the general-fund surplus limitation provision will tend 
to insure against any unforeseen disastrous consequences. 
Therefore, there probably will be no disastrous political 
consequences for either the legislature or the executive 
stemming from major defects in the relief measure. 
However, an important consideration is that the Homestead 
Relief Act in all probability will not be funded for more than 
the two years of the current biennium- possibly only one. 
This means the state has not dealt with the problems of the 
property tax on an ongoing basis. The Homestead Relief Act 
represents a rebate plan that is, and probably always will be, 
dependent upon a state general-fund surplus- a dependence 
that limits its impact as a permanent aid to property 
taxpayers. This analysis means simply that the 1979 
Montana legislature will be faced again with the 
responsibility of addressing property tax relief or property 
tax reform, and with much less than a $50 million general-
fund surplus. 
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